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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Violation
of a Protective Order, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-108

(1997).

This Court

invokes

jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

convicting

Culley

of

violation of a protective order when there was no evidence that
Culley was properly served with the order.
sufficiency

of

the

evidence

in

a

criminal

When examining the
bench

trial,

reviewing court applies a "clearly erroneous" standard:

the

if the

trial court's verdict in a criminal case is "against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the
[verdict] will be set aside."

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193

(Utah 1987); City of Orem v. Lee, 846 P.2d 450

(Utah Ct. App.

1993) ; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) . Whether a person has been "properly
served" is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness.

In Re

Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Utah 1993); Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d
1182, 1184 n.3 (Utah 1991).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-108, Protective orders restraining abuse of
another--violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to
a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title
30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a,
1

Juvenile Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act, or a foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12,
who intentionally violates that order after having been properly
served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4,2. Protective orders--Ex parte protective
orders--Modification of orders--Service of process--Duties of the
court
•

*

•

*

(5)(a) Each protective order shall include two separate
portions, one for provisions, the violation of which are criminal
offenses, and one for provisions, the violation of which are civil
violations, as follows:
(i) criminal offenses are those under Subsections 30-6-4.2(2) (a)
through (e), and under Subsection 30-6-4.2(3)(a) as it refers to
Subsections 30-6-4.2(2)(a) through (e); and
(ii) civil offenses are those under Subsections 30-6-4 .2(2) (f)
through
(h) , and Subsection 30-6-4.2(3) (a) as it refers to
Subsections 30-6-4.2 (2) (f) through (h) .
(b) The criminal provision portion shall include a statement
that violation of any criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) The civil provision portion shall include a notice that
violation of or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject
to contempt proceedings.
(6) The protective order shall include:
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court,
when the civil portion of the protective order either expires or is
scheduled for review by the court, which date may not exceed 150
days after the date the order is issued, unless the court indicates
on the record the reason for setting a date beyond 150 days;
(b) information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate
identification of the respondent, such as social security number,
driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone number,
and physical description;
and
(c) a statement advising the petitioner that:
(i)

after

three

years

from

2

the

date

of

issuance

of

the

protective order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the criminal
portion of the protective order;
(ii) the petitioner should, within the 30 days prior to the end
of the three-year period, advise the court of the petitioner's
current address for notice of any hearing; and
(iii) the address provided by the petitioner will not be made
available to the respondent.
•

*

•

*

(8)(a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the
court, pursuant to Subsection (5) (a) , shall provide expedited
service for orders for protection issued in accordance with this
chapter, and shall transmit verification of service of process,
when the order has been served, to the statewide domestic violence
network described in Section 30-6-8.
•

*

*

*

(12) Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific
than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective
orders, the provisions of this chapter govern.
Utah

R u ^ e Q£

civji Procedure 4.
•

ess.
*

•

•

(h) Manner of Proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a) (1) ,
the party serving the process shall file proof of service with the
court promptly, and in any event within the time during which the
person served must respond to the process, and proof of service
must be made within ten days after such service. Failure to file
proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In
all cases commenced under Rule 3(a) (1) or Rule 3(a) (2), the proof
of service shall be made as follows:
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or
the deputy of any of them, by certificate with a statement as to
the date, place, and manner of service;
•

*

*

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By amended information, Murray City charged Roderick Culley of
violating a protective order "on the 10th day of October
through the 17th day of January 1 9 9 7 . . . "
3

(R. at 16)

[1996]
A bench

trial was held on September 5, 1997, and the trial judge convicted
Culley

of

the

offense.

(Transcript

at

2,

29)

[Hereinafter

"Trans."]
To be guilty of the crime of violation of a protective order
it is necessary that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused was "properly served" with the order before
he violated the order.

No evidence of proper service was adduced

at trial, so the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.
Culley should have been acquitted.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At

trial, Culley's

prosecution.

Stout

ex-wife

testified

Lisa
that

Stout
she

and

testified
Culley

for
had

the
been

separated for about four years and that they shared two children.
She stated that in September of 1996, she applied for a protective
order against Culley.

She and Culley appeared at a hearing on her

application and the application was granted.

A copy of a certified

copy of the protective order was admitted into evidence.

(Trans,

at 4-7)
There was no evidence that Culley was properly served with the
actual order.

In closing argument, the prosecutor merely observed

that Culley was present when the order was granted and that there
were "some boxes checked on the on the [sic] protective order that
suggests he was there along with [counsel] when it was granted."
The trial judge found that a lawful protective order was in place
on the January 16, 1997, but he did not specifically find that
4

Culley had been properly served with the order.
The protective
indirectly

order prohibited

contacting,

harassing,

Culley

(Trans, at 26, 28)
"from

telephoning

directly

or

or

otherwise

communicating with the petitioner except for visitation."

(Trans,

at 8)
Stout testified that she had had contact with Culley after the
issuance of the protective order.

On direct examination, Stout

related that between October 10, 1996, and January 17, 1997, she
received at least three phone calls each week from Culley.

Stout

testified that the phone calls sometimes dealt with matters other
than

visitation.

On

cross-examination,

she

stated

that

she

received phone calls from Culley on the 16th of January, but she
did not say what was discussed during those calls.

Stout testified

that she received about six phone calls from Culley between ten
o'clock at night and two o'clock in the morning.

(Trans, at 9-12)

However, counsel questioned Stout regarding records of phone
calls on her

caller

I.D.

Specifically,

and

contrary

to her

testimony on direct examination, she conceded that the caller I.D.
had shown only three calls on the 16th of January
12:32 a.m., and 8:25 a.m.).

(12:01 a.m.,

Stout also admitted that during this

period of time Culley had advised her that their daughter was ill
and complaining of headaches. (Trans, at 12, 18, 21)
Culley testified in his own behalf regarding the telephone
calls on January 16, 1997.

He stated that his daughter Libby had

been complaining of terrible headaches and had been vomiting, and
he had called Stout to get her opinion about what he should do.
5

Culley testified that he thought he could contact Stout to discuss
the childrens' medical problems, that he believed that such contact
was not a violation of the protective order, and that he did not
intend to violate the protective order.
Finally,

Culley

provided

(Trans, at 20-22)

unrebutted

testimony

daughter was the one who asked him to contact Stout.

that

his

(Trans, at

25)
The trial judge convicted Culley, and concluded that contact
to discuss a medical problem suffered by one of the children was
not a defense to the crime.

(Trans, at 29)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was no evidence that Culley was "properly served" with
the protective

order before he made

contact with Lisa Stout.

Service of process of a protective order is described in Utah Code
Ann. § 30-6-4.2(8)(a), which requires the county sheriff to serve
the respondent named in a protective order.

Rule 4(h) (1) of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the sheriff to file a
certificate of service with the court.

Because the prosecution

presented no evidence that service was properly accomplished, or
done at all, Culley's conviction cannot stand.

ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in convicting Culley of violation
of a protective order because there was no evidence that
Culley was properly served with the order.
Violation of a protective order consists of the following
6

elements, each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) a person is a respondent in a protective order, (2) the order
was issued pursuant to Utah law, (3) the order was properly served
on the respondent, and (4) the respondent intentionally violated
the

order

after

it was

served.

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 76-5-108.

Culley's argument involves the third element--proper service.

The

issue is whether service of process (on the order itself and not
just the petition) was properly made in compliance with Utah law.
There was no evidence at trial that process was properly made, and
so the prosecution did not meet its burden at to the proper service
element

of the offense.1

Accordingly,

there was

insufficient

evidence to convict Culley.
The protective order in this case stemmed from a domestic
civil proceeding.

Hence, proper service of the order is set forth

in Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2 (8) (a) of the Cohabitant Abuse Act,
which requires the county sheriff to serve process of all orders
issued under the statute.

Rule 4(h) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure mandates that if process
office,

the

sheriff

must

file

a

is served by the sheriff's
certificate

with

the

court

containing the date, place, and manner of service.2
1

Under the plain language of section 76-5-108, it is clear
that proof of proper service is an element of the offense, and not
simply a jurisdictional matter as it would be in a civil lawsuit.
Therefore, proof of proper service is part of the prosecution's
burden at trial rather than a jurisdictional issue to be raised by
a defendant in advance of trial.
2

"Service of process" is the term used in section 30-64.2(8)(a).
Service of process is distinguished from service of
other pleadings and papers, which is controlled by Rule 5, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7

At trial there was evidence presented, through Lisa Stout,
that a hearing was held on Stout's petition for a protective order
and that Culley was present at the hearing accompanied by counsel.
There was no evidence presented as to how Culley learned about the
hearing.

There was no evidence that the hearing was preceded by an

ex parte protective order or that such order, if
properly served on Culley by the sheriff's office.

issued, was
See Reed, 806

P.2d at 1185 (uncontroverted evidence that sheriff left summons at
home of defendant's parents and made required return of service).
In closing argument the prosecutor stated that Culley was present
when the order was granted and that there were "some boxes checked
on the on the- [sic] protective order that suggests he was there
along with [counsel] when it was granted.11

The trial judge found

that a lawful protective order was in place on January 16, 1997,
but he did not specifically find that Culley had been properly
served with the order.

(Trans, at 26, 28)

Indeed, the judge could

not find that Culley had been properly served since there was no
evidence he had been served.

One may infer that because Culley was

at the hearing he had been served with the application filed by
Lisa Stout, but the order itself could not have been signed until
the hearing took place.

Under section 76-5-108 it is the signed

order, not the petition, that binds the conduct of a respondent or
defendant, and for purposes of attributing criminal liability under
the statute the order could only become binding when

"properly

served" on Culley.
This issue does not reflect a mere technicality, but instead
8

encompasses
requirement

fundamental
of

the Due

fairness
Process

concerns

Clause.

under

If

the

Culley

notice

was

never

properly served with the order, there can be no assurance that he
received and read the contents of the order.

In determining what

he was permitted to do under the order, he may have been relying on
his memory of what happened at the hearing or what his lawyer told
him.

The legislature could have chosen to include more flexible

language in the statute regarding the manner in which a respondent
was to be put on notice that he was subject to criminal sanction
for violating a protective order.

But the language used in the

statutory scheme is clear and absolute:

the manner of proper

service is dictated by section 30-6-4.2 (8) (a) , andU.R.C.P. 4(h)(1)
requires the filing of a certificate with the court by the sheriff
proving process was served.

The record in this case is void of any

evidence that this occurred.
Culley's argument does not suggest that failure to comply with
the terms of the order would have to go unpunished.

On the

contrary, the judicial officer who signed the order still had the
jurisdiction to issue Culley with a contempt citation and punish
him accordingly.
10.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-17, 78-32-1(5), 78-32-

In addition, there is nothing to prevent proper service of the

order now.

Simply put, at trial the court received no evidence

that Culley had been served with the protective order in compliance
with section 30-6-4.2(8) (a).
he cannot be held criminally

Accordingly, until properly served,
liable for violating the order.

9

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Culley requests
this Court to reverse the judgment of conviction.
DATED this

Q

day of June, 1998.

D. GILBERT ATHAY
MICHAEL R. SIKORA
Lawyers for Appellant

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant was mailed or hand-delivered on the
1998, to:
Murray City Prosecutor
5025 South State
Murray, UT 8410 7

11

^v day of June,
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D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143)
MICHAEL R. SIKORA (6986)
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone; (801) 363-707 4
Lawyer for Defendant
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

MURRAY PTVISION

SALT LAKE COUN'l V , S'lAIK <J\ i'AH
MURRAY CITY,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 9710 00369
RODERICK CULLEY,"
:

Judge Joseph Fratto

Defendant.

Please take notice that defendant Roderick Culler, by and
through his lawyers P, Gilbert Athay and MiJhaei !

ji/;j.a,

appeals the judgment and conviction in the above captioned
matter.

Judgment and conviction were entered on October 14,

1997.
DATED:

X.

November 14, 19 9 7,

J
6^

D. GILBERT ATHAY
MICHAEL R. SIKORA
Lawyers for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I c e r tify that: a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, on the
)y day of
November, 19 91, toi
Murray City Prosecutor
5025 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randall Gaither
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT

84102

2

CRIMINAL JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
Case No. _

milaSLJSl

Defendant's address

APPEARANCES/PLEA
•The above entitled case came on for arraigninent/pre-trial/rrial/preliminary hearine before the Honprabl
., Judge of the above ent^ed
op th^^y/^-day of =J^/j
enticed cpui?
c
•District
bis Attorney
9 v - 7 Plaintiff was represented by
'L
jO-Murray City Attorney.
. . .

.

,

,

'-A

j

I.U.The defendant appeared in person and wasAvno not represented by .
._ as counsel.
[J The defendant failed to appear, and the Court finding that the defendant had received proper notice of the trial date and had
voluntarily absented himself therefrom, the trial is ordered to proceed in absentia
O The defendant entered his plea of guilty to the following charge(s):
Count I
Count II
_
Count IH
Count IV

JUDGMENT
After hearing the evidence in llie mallei and taking into consideration the arguments of" the parties, the Court finds the
M) Guilty ( ) Not Guiity ( ) Dismissed
f ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed
( ) Guilty ( ) Not Guilty ( ) Dismissed

( ) Amended to
( ) Amended to
( ) Amended to
( ) Amended to
( ) Amended to

SENTENCE

iU

On the
day of
, 19 9*1i the Court sentenced the defendant as follows
(1) Imprisoned in the
jail/prison for a period of -^ ^--> ^clayi/months/years, and
(2) Ordered to pay a fine in the ount of $
VyyO.ftr^
.
(3) The Court suspended $
i ^ ^ o f t n e f m e and
1 > ^ _£jflpys/months/years of the jail sentence.
(4) Home confinement for
days/months in lieu of jail monitored by
(5) Work in a community service program for a period of ,
days/hours in lieu of jail/fine at charity of
choice/ .
to be completed by
(6) Ordered to pay Legal Defender fee in the amount of S
(7) Submit to outpatient/inpatient treatment at
for a period of
days/months Aftercare as deemed necessary by the treating facility.
(8) Pica held in abeyance for a period of
days/months. Count(s)
may be
dismissed/reduced to
__
if no further violations.
(9) Count(s)
_. to be dismissed/reduced upon completion of Traffic School/Defensive Driving Course
and payment of $
cost by
.
(10) Deft to pay restitution in the amount of $ .
All restitution is to be payed to
the Court/
who will reimburse the victtm(s).
(11) Court ordered term of probaljon for a period of
^ V J m a r ^ K ^ daysy^TomE^ defendant to be supervised
under the following conditions:
«V.
No further violations of the law.
. Weekly AA meetings for „ ,
weeksf**» O^fAntabuse
, „ . times per week monitored by __IS

h

—CoPCf>
—
—

JCOL _ & . o * - * U \ x . » _ * r £ _ = L

(12) Defendant is granted a stay to .
to commence serving this jail/prison sentence. Defendant to report to
(13) lo be payed at $
per month beginning

DATED this

day of

dofok^

Defendant received a (copy of the above judgment and sentence on the date the judge sign.

C

D

RPR 2 5 PP1
U nn^T
^y u I
MURRAY DEPT.

RANDY B.HART (#1399)
Attorney for Plaintiff
5025 South State Street
Post Office Box 57520
Murray, Utah 84157-0520
Telephone: (801) 264-2642

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNT

ILED BY: RANDY B. HART
MURRAY CITY
Plaintiff,
AMENDED
INFORMATION
OTN:
Release Type: None

vs.
RODERICK J. CULLEY
4265 S. 900 E.
Salt Lake City, L
DOB: 10/19/51

)
)

I

III I I II I I I II IIII ll I

,

l<~3b<jf

)

Defendant.

)

DL: #Ut. 2637324_

$ 6-^i-^n

The undersigned complainant, Cindy L. Tooms, under oath, states on information
and belief that the defendant committed, in Murray City, State of Utah, the crime(s) of:
I
VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER, to wit: That on the 10th day of October through
the 17th day of January 1997, the defendant, being a person who has been restrained
from abusing or contacting another or to remain away from the premises of the other's
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a protective order
or exparte protective order issued, did violate that order, at or near 309 E. 450n s #7,

Murray, Utah, in violation of Section 76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated, a oic
Misdemeanor.

<K

nformatinn is IUM'II II|IHII ilir cviiJi'iii 11 obtained from the following witnesses:
OFFICER: L Gibbs, MCPD
DETECTIVE: J. Peterson, MCPD
AGENCY CASE NUMBER: 97-747
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant, Murray City Attorney, based upon information provided by Detective
J. Peterson, Murray City Police Department, hereby states that on or about the 10th day
of October 1996 through and including the 17th day of January 1997, at or near 309 E.
4500 S., #7, Murray City, Utah, the defendant, Roderick J. Culley, did place telephone
calls to the victim's, Lisa Stouts, residence on occasions from October 10,1996 between
the hours of 11:45 p.m. to January 17, 1997 8:25 a.m. The phone calls were on the
victim's caller I.D. Box. A protective order was signed by Judge Casey in the Third District
Court on 9/26/96 prohibiting defendant from contacting, harassing and telephoning the
victim except for arranging for visitation of the children.

Cindy L. Tooms (Affiant)
Murray City Prosecutor

